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ABSTRACT This paper addresses the role of the Australian local government grants system in promoting 
efficiency, and examines whether or not the intergovernmental grants process, along with institutional, 
structural and environmental characteristics, exerts an influence on the efficient provision of local public 
services. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used to obtain measures of technical and scale efficiency across 
three local government functions; namely, library services, waste management services, and planning and 
regulatory services. When grant relativities are regressed against these efficiency indices using simultaneous 
equation tobit models, the results generally indicate that the desired objective of effort (or policy) neutrality is 
maintained. However, failure to address issues of optimal scale size, amongst others, may force local councils 
to provide an inappropriately funded scale of operations. The findings also suggest that deviations from the 
distribution of financial assistance solely on the basis of horizontal equalisation may be a further influence on 
inefficient outcomes in the local public sector. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
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In common with all federal systems of government, the Australian Commonwealth is 
characterised by fiscal imbalance. In the context of a federation, it is possible to identify 
two kinds of fiscal imbalances. Firstly, vertical fiscal imbalances arise because different 
levels of government have differing capacities to raise revenues to finance expenditure. 
And secondly, horizontal fiscal imbalances occur since the various states and local 
governments that comprise a federation experience divergent costs in the provision of 
public goods and do not have equivalent revenue-raising capacities. Various institutional 
responses have been developed to deal with the problems posed by fiscal imbalances, 
involving either tax-sharing arrangements or fiscal equalisation schemes. Whilst most 
federal countries have pursued formal or informal tax-sharing arrangements between 
different levels of government, Australia has established a policy of horizontal fiscal 
equalisation. Indeed, it has been cogently argued that "Australia has developed the most 
comprehensive, effective and equitable system of fiscal equalisation in the world" 
(Mathews, 1994: 16). 
The process of fiscal equalisation in Australia is carried out by the Commonwealth 
Grants Commission (CGC) and several state-based Local Government Grants 
Commissions (LGGCs) under the so-called ‘principle of fiscal equalisation’. Under this 
principle (CGC, 1990: 5): 
[E]ach [state or local government] is entitled to receive a level of general 
revenue funding from the Commonwealth which would enable it to provide, 
without having to impose taxes and charges at levels appreciably higher than 
the levels imposed by the other [state or local governments], government 
services at standards which are not appreciably different from the standards 
provided by the other [state or local governments]. 
In the case of the local public sector, the calculations made using the principle of fiscal 
equalisation are used as the basis for ‘financial assistance grants’ (or FAGs) which form 
an important source of local government revenue.  
The question naturally arises as to the relative importance of FAGs in the context of 
all revenue sources available to New South Wales’ (NSW) local governments. Section 
491 of the NSW Local Government Act 1993 specifies the main sources of a given 
council’s income as rates, charges, fees, FAGs, borrowing and investments. Table 1 
(NSW Department of Local Government, 1997) shows how NSW local government in 
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aggregate derived its income for the fiscal years 1994/95 and 1995/96: Although rates are 
obviously the major source of revenue in NSW local government, Table 1 also indicates 
that grant revenue is nevertheless significant at around a fifth of all income. 
Table 1. Percentage Sources of Revenue for NSW Local Government 
 1994/95 1995/96 
Rate revenue 39.4 46.9 
User charges and fees 20.0 18.5 
Interest revenue 3.3 3.9 
Grant revenue 18.1 18.2 
Contributions and donations 9.2 9.2 
Other operating revenue 10.0 3.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 
However, these general observations in the relative importance of FAGs in NSW 
should be qualified in at least two respects. Firstly, substantial differences exist in terms 
of the proportion of rates revenue to total revenue between the various categories of local 
government in the Australian Classification of Local Government (ACLG). For example, 
the NSW Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) (1998: 10) has observed 
that “rural councils receive a larger proportion of their revenues in grants…a group of the 
smallest rural councils in NSW receives about 50 percent of its total income from grants. 
This compares with a group of Sydney metropolitan councils which receives 
approximately 11 percent of revenues from grants”. 
Secondly, the deregulation of NSW local governments under the NSW Local 
Government Act 1993 and the introduction of ‘rate-pegging’ has generally led to an 
increasing reliance on fees and charges in comparison with other sources of finance. This 
has meant inter alia that grant revenue has decreased in significance over time, Put 
differently, “…Commonwealth funding of local councils has declined substantially in 
real term” (IPART, 1998: 10). Overall the significance of grant revenue is declining, 
however its relative importance varies substantially between different sources of income 
and the various categories of local governments. 
Notwithstanding some of these qualifications, the Australian Urban and Regional 
Development Review (AURDR) (1994a: xv) has argued that “potentially, financial 
assistance grants exert a powerful influence over the rating and funding decisions of 
many councils”. However, to date the Commonwealth has not required the LGGCs to pay 
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explicit attention to a number of policy-related decisions by councils in grant allocation, 
one of which is the efficiency with which local councils operate. The reasons for this 
appear to be threefold. First, under the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act 
horizontal equalisation has been the major policy goal. Second, the phrase ‘by reasonable 
effort’ in the legislation has largely been interpreted to refer solely to the rating effort of 
councils, and does not take into account any matters concerning reasonable efforts to 
ensure economic efficiency. Finally, the assumption of ‘effort neutrality’ which relates to 
policy decisions by councils has been interpreted to mean that councils should not be able 
to act in a manner which affects their grant (AURDR, 1994a: 13). Accordingly, grants to 
councils only reflect factors beyond their control, and therefore the LGGC grants process 
neither rewards nor penalises councils with differing levels of efficiency. 
Despite this, it has been argued that LGGC methodologies have influenced the 
efficiency of local councils, irrespective of their lack of legislative mandate (AURDR, 
1994a). On one hand, it has been argued that “by providing the highest per capita support 
to those councils with revenue raising difficulties and expenditure needs in regard to size, 
sparsity, location and cost disabilities, [the grants system] may not be conducive to an 
efficient allocation of resources” (AURDR, 1994a: 55). The NSW Independent Pricing 
and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) (1998: 39) supported this argument as follows: 
The Federal Assistance Grants Act 1995 provides a direct grant for local 
government against formulae determined by each state through the Grants 
Commission to equalise the effect of remoteness and size. This formula 
actually creates and encourages inefficiency by retaining small 
institutions…[It has been proposed] that the grant formula should not fully 
and automatically compensate councils to the full extent of higher overhead 
costs associated with remoteness and size as it reduces the incentive to form 
larger organisations or to become more efficient. 
By way of contrast, it has been observed that “councils which are cost effective may 
be rewarded through unit cost adjustments up to the standard if their operations are cost 
effective” (AURDR, 1994a: 14). For example, the NSW Local Government Grants 
Commission (NSWLGGC) (1994: 16) has argued that the grants process indirectly 
rewards efficient councils: 
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Because of the effort neutral approach a council’s grant is assessed 
independent of policy decisions by councils, a council that provides a cost 
effective service still receives grant funding which it can allocate to it’s 
priorities. For example, two councils which were identical in every respect 
except efficiency would receive identical grants. The efficient council can use 
its grant funds to provide even better facilities for the ratepayers. The 
inefficient council of the two would need to apply the grant funds to prop up 
an inefficient operation. 
In response to these uncertainties, the AURDR (1994a: 60) undertook a number of 
statistical analyses to test the hypothesis “that a council with a lower than standard unit 
expenditure would, after the application of a disability factor, invariably always be given 
a significantly higher standardised unit expenditure (and consequently a higher grant) and 
vice versa”. The results indicated that a strong relationship did exist between actual unit 
expenditure and standardised expenditure per capita. The AURDR (1994a: 61) concluded 
that: 
[T]he application of disability factors are serving to improve the grant 
outcome for councils with low unity expenditures on administration and 
worsen the grant outcome for councils with high unit expenditures ... there 
seems to be some support for the proposition that in the way the Commission 
apply their judgements on disability factors in order to determine 
standardised expenditures, that LGGCs are implicitly rewarding [efficient] 
councils and penalising [inefficient] councils. 
However, the AURDR (1994a) study has a number of limitations. First, and foremost, 
the AURDR (1994a: 63) itself admits that the use of expenditure per capita as a proxy for 
technical efficiency “has been shown to be inadequate measure”. A subsequent analysis 
found that the chosen measure of efficiency (ie. administration expense per capita) was 
totally unrelated to an alternative measure of efficiency (ie. administration expense as a 
percentage of total expenditure). Second, the study was based solely on the Victorian 
Grants Commission (VGC), and while the AURDR (1994a: 60) argued that the results 
“are illustrative of the likely outcomes in other states”, this is unlikely to be the case 
given the variation in grants methodologies across state borders.  
Finally, the VGC takes account of very few disability factors in its allocations. For 
example, whereas in most states an increasing share of funds has been directed to 
councils with the highest index of socio-economic disadvantage, the reverse appears to 
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hold in Victoria (AURDR, 1994b: xii). This suggests that the postulated association 
between efficiency (as measured by per capita administration costs) and grants may not 
be valid because efficient councils are implicitly being given more income by the grants 
process. Instead, the case may be that when the grants methodology fails to correctly 
account for all disability factors (ie. those that usually apply to high administration cost 
councils), all low administration costs per capita councils, whether efficient or not, are 
given larger grants than should be the case under horizontal equalisation.  
In this paper, we examine the relationship between the productive efficiency of local 
governments in New South Wales and the allocative methodology employed by the 
state’s Local Government Grants Commission. The purpose of this exercise is twofold. 
First, we calculate measures of technical efficiency using nonparametric methods for 
three local government functions, namely, library services, domestic waste management 
services, and planning and regulatory services. The indices thus obtained are then 
compared against the objective criteria used by the NSWLGGC in order to identify the 
impact of disabilities in councils’ operating environment on measured efficiency. Second, 
we compare these efficiency measures against standardised unit expenditures using the 
methodology employed by the LGGC to see if grants to local governments are 
systematically related to council efficiency.   
2. THE FUNCTIONS OF NSW LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
In comparison with many other governance systems, Australian local government 
takes on substantially less functions. For example, in the United Kingdom local 
government authorities provide major services such as education, social services, 
housing, public transport and local amenities, and local governments in the U.S generally 
bear responsibility for any number of major social policy services, including social 
security, hospitals and health care, schools and police. However, apart from general 
public services, local governments in Australia do provide uniquely different services to 
those produced by both the States and Territories or the Commonwealth. In terms of 
those areas where local governments are disproportionately represented in outlays, 
especially housing and community services and recreation and culture, a wide range of 
activities are undertaken. Included in the former are housing for the general community 
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and those with special needs, water supply, sanitation, waste management and protection 
of the environment, and functions relating to street-lighting, cemeteries, bus shelters and 
public conveniences. The latter function includes the provision of libraries and museums, 
community halls, outdoor recreation areas, footpaths, and walking and cycling paths.  
Further, even where councils’ contributions to public sector outlays are relatively 
minor, there are ways in which local governments in Australia can influence the nature 
and extent of local economic development. For example, local government’s contribution 
to transport and communication outlays is largely concentrated in the areas of municipal 
roads and bridges, with only highways and major roads accounted for by state authorities. 
Similarly, local governments’ control over zoning, planning and development enables 
local government in Australia to exert considerable control over matters of regional 
development. 
The IPART (1998: 5) report lists five primary functional areas in NSW local 
government: (i) land management, planning and infrastructure provision, including 
development and environmental planning, heritage conservation, building supervision, 
and roadworks; (ii) community amenities, including parks, gardens and sporting grounds, 
water and sewerage supplies, library services, street lighting and street cleaning; (iii) 
community welfare services, covering child care services, women's refuges, and aged and 
disability accommodation; (iv) public health and safety, including garbage 
collection/disposal and inspection of commercial premises; and (v) corporate functions, 
being strategic planning for the area, resource and service management, property 
management, and working with the community and state and federal governments on 
economic development, employment and tourism promotion. 
Given the wide range of functions performed by NSW local government, in order to 
examine the productive efficient of councils and their relationship to the allocative 
methodology employed by the NSWLGGC, it is necessary to be selective in the choice of 
the actual functions analysed. Various considerations are relevant. Firstly, data 
constraints are important. For example, the NSW Department of Local Government has 
published data on 24 key performance indicators across a broad spectrum of municipal 
activity. Accordingly, this delineated the kinds of functions that could be examined. 
Secondly, it was felt that only a subset of these functions could feasibly be handled in a 
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single study. Correspondingly, those functions should be drawn from different areas of 
council activity to be representative of the diversity of functions. With these and other 
considerations in mind, three functions were selected: (i) library services, as an example 
of the human services delivered by NSW councils; (ii) domestic waste management 
services, representative of the community services provided by local governments; and 
(iii) planning and regulatory services, as an instance of the economic services supplied by 
municipalities.  
Each of these services nevertheless has various idiosyncratic aspects to its production 
function, which inhibit the efficiency of performance indicators. We shall briefly evaluate 
the three functions employed in this study (library services, domestic waste management 
services, and planning and regulatory services) in terms of how well published 
performance indicator data employed here reflect actual performance. Firstly, and in 
common with many library systems elsewhere in the developed world, NSW public 
libraries provide a broad range of services beyond simply issuing books to borrowers. For 
example, libraries also allow clients to read newspapers and magazines, enjoy computing 
facilities and Internet access, conduct research and undertake a host of other activities. 
Moreover, libraries are used by both citizens and by people from other local government 
jurisdictions. Accordingly, the two published key performance indicators, operating 
expenses per census resident and issues per capita, will not adequately reflect the full 
extent of library activity and thus may not provide satisfactory indicators of performance. 
Secondly, in NSW local councils provide many domestic waste management services 
to their respective communities, including collection and recycling services, landfill 
disposal facilities, and waste minimisation strategies. Although probably less complex 
than library services, each service and its related performance indicator can be influenced 
by numerous variables. For instance, the size of garbage containers, frequency of 
collection, distance to disposal facilities, and many other factors affect average 
expenditure per property. Clearly published performance indicators used in this study, 
namely collection expenditure, total garbage collected, recyclables collected and the 
‘implied recycling rate’, cannot precisely describe the efficiency of domestic waste 
management and recycling services. 
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Finally, five published performance indicators were available for planning and 
regulatory services in NSW at the time of this empirical study, namely, planning and 
regulatory expenditure, legal expenditure on planning, full-time equivalent planning staff, 
the number of building approvals (BAs) determined, and the number of development 
applications (DAs) decided. Given the obvious complexities inherent in the planning and 
regulatory function of NSW local government, it is clear that these indicators could never 
do full justice to this service. For example, BAs and DAs alone are influenced by a 
myriad of factors, not least the nature and complexity of applications, exemptions, public 
consultation, urban growth rates, litigation, ‘fast-tracking’ policies and zoning 
restrictions. 
NSW local governments themselves have been consulted extensively on the 
application of performance indicators and their usefulness. In its final report 
Benchmarking Local Government Performance in New South Wales, IPART (1998: 67) 
notes that a general consensus exists for a future concentration on “a small range of 
effective indicators”, including some “measure of customer satisfaction”. Nevertheless, 
most councils supported the development of performance indicators per se even though 
they pinpointed numerous disadvantages and weaknesses in the current system. 
Hence, despite the manifest problems inherent in currently available published data on 
performance indicators collected by the NSW Department of Local Government 
(NSWDLG 1995; 1996), including those available for library services, domestic waste 
management, and planning and regulatory services, scare research resources obliged us to 
employ this information, When they are collected and published, improved performance 
indicators of NSW local government should greatly assist future researchers.  
3. MEASURES OF TECHNICAL AND SCALE EFFICIENCY 
The first methodological requirement is to specify the models used for calculating 
local government efficiency. The deterministic, nonparametric methods, which originate 
from the seminal contribution of Farrell (1957), are based on piecewise linear frontiers 
calculated using mathematical programming techniques. These methods envelop the data 
as closely as possible subject to minimal assumptions regarding the structure of the 
production technology. The method itself is the data envelopment analysis (DEA) model 
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developed by Charnes et al. (1978) and extended in Seiford and Thrall (1990), among 
others [the mathematical presentation below follows Coelli et al. (1998)]. The purpose of 
DEA is to construct a non-parametric envelopment frontier over the data points such that 
all observed points lie on or below the production frontier. The model formulation is 
constructed on the basis of an ‘input-orientation’ (indicating the desired minimisation of 
inputs to some given level of output). This orientation towards inputs (as against outputs) 
is used to reflect the fact that, at least in the short-run, local governments cannot readily 
control the demand for services as represented by their ‘imposed’ jurisdictional 
population. The appropriateness of an input orientation where providers must supply a 
universal service is also recognised by the London Economics’ (1999) study of electricity 
distributors and several of the public sector analyses surveyed in SCRCSSP (1998).  
Consider N local councils each producing M different outputs using K different inputs. 
The K×N input matrix, X, and the M×N output matrix, Y, represent the data of all N local 
councils, while for the individual council these are represented by the vectors xi and yi. 
The relative efficiency of each local council in ratio form (where for each local council 
we obtain a ratio of all outputs over all inputs) is specified as follows: 
max ( )
,
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' '
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u v i i
j j
u y v x
y v x
u v
s.t. u' ≤
≥
1
0
        (1) 
where yi is the vector of outputs produced by the ith local council, xi is the vector of 
inputs used by the ith local council, u is a M×1 vector of output weights and v is a K×1 
vector of input weights (the prime denotes a transposed vector), i runs from 1 to N, and j 
equals 1, 2, ..., N. The first inequality ensures that the efficiency ratios for all local 
councils cannot exceed one, whilst the second ensures that the weights are non-negative. 
The weights are determined such that each local council maximises its own efficiency 
ratio. A problem with this particular ratio formulation is that it has an infinite number of 
solutions. To avoid this the constraint v′xi = 1 is imposed. This fractional linear program 
(1) can then be transformed into the following equivalent linear programming problem: 
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where the notation change from u and v to μ and ν reflects the transformation. Using the 
duality of linear programming, this multiplier form can then be used to derive an 
equivalent envelopment form of the problem: 
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where θ is a scalar and λ is a N×1 vector of constants. The value of θ will be the technical 
efficiency score for a particular local council. It will satisfy θ ≤ 1, with a value of 1 
indicating a point on the frontier, and hence a technically efficient local council. The 
value of θ ≤ 1 identifies the amount of any inefficiencies that may be present.  
The model specified in (3) has an assumption of constant returns-to-scale (CRS) and is 
only appropriate where all local councils are operating at an optimal scale. Where this 
assumption does not hold, scale effects will confound the measures of technical 
efficiency. Generally, regulatory, geographical and institutional constraints imply that most 
councils are not operating at an optimal scale. Following Banker et al. (1984) the linear 
programming problem can be modified to account for variable returns-to-scale (VRS) (that 
is, measures of technical efficiency without scale efficiency effects) by adding the 
convexity constraint N1′λ = 1 to (3). This provides a measure of pure technical efficiency. 
Dividing overall technical efficiency by pure technical efficiency yields a measure of scale 
efficiency. A more detailed examination of DEA in public sector efficiency measurement 
may be found in SCRCSSP (1997) and Worthington and Dollery (1999).  
4. LOCAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS IN THE GRANTS PROCESS 
The second methodological requirement is to specify the local government functions 
used to test the relationships between efficiency and grants. As we indicated earlier, three 
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functions are selected (with function type in brackets): (i) library services (human); (ii) 
domestic waste management services (community); and (iii) planning and regulatory 
services (economic). Variables and selected descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2. 
For each function three groups of variables are listed. These are: (i) local council 
disability factors; (ii) standardised unit expenditures; and (iii) discretionary inputs and 
outputs. The first two sets of variables are derived from the NSW Local Governments 
Grants Commission’s relative grant calculations, whereas the third set of variables are 
collected by the NSW Department of Local Government for the purposes of comparative 
performance assessment. 
Disability factors 
The first group of variables are the disabilities which the NSWLGGC has considered 
to be the most significant in influencing a council’s expenditure on a particular function. 
These form a disability factor for each function which reflects the additional cost, 
expressed as percentage, of providing a standard service because of inherent disabilities 
which are beyond a council’s control.  
For example, the disability factors for library services are; (i) population distribution 
(DIST) (recognising the extra costs of providing library services in more than one urban 
centre); (ii) proportion of the population from a non-English speaking background 
(NESB) (additional costs of information provision); (iii) proportion of the population 
aged (AGE) (cost of special services to the aged such as large print books or home 
visiting); (iv) proportion of the population who are students (STUD) (recognising 
students as a major user group); and (v) proportion of non-residential borrowers (NRES) 
(additional costs involved in providing services to an extra-jurisdictional user group).  
In waste management services the disability factors are: (i) occupancy rate (OCC) 
(input variation due to the higher level of service required in areas with a high number of 
persons per property); (ii) population density (DENS) (additional costs due to the 
constraints placed upon the use of machinery in urban areas); (iii) population distribution 
(DIST) (reflecting costs of staff travel and duplication of services in scattered 
populations), and (iv) an index of disposal cost (DISP) (a function of standardised 
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tonnage of garbage collected, cartage distances to receiving depot and receiving charges 
at depot).  
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Table 2. Unit Expenditures, Disability Factors and Discretionary Inputs and Outputs 
Description Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
I. DISABILITY FACTORS     
Library services     
Population distribution 4.5566 5.8811 0.0000 25.3725 
Proportion of population from NESB 0.0852 0.0950 0.0042 0.4378 
Proportion of population aged 0.0598 0.1025 0.0000 0.6100 
Proportion of population students 0.1677 0.0358 0.0761 0.2568 
Proportion of non-residential borrowers 0.1907 0.0294 0.0000 0.3300 
Waste management services     
Occupancy rate 0.0267 0.0053 0.0123 0.0434 
Population density: 0.2696 0.2712 0.0126 1.8993 
Population distribution  0.0965 0.1939 0.0000 1.0075 
Cost of disposal index 0.2720 0.0879 0.1746 0.4972 
Planning and regulatory services     
Population growth rate 0.0127 0.0136 0.0000 0.0466 
Development index 13.0182 34.3487 4.7275 395.8696 
Heritage/environmental sensitivity  2.0625 0.8762 1.0000 5.0000 
Non-residential building activity 0.0231 0.0278 0.0000 0.3058 
Population distribution 4.4533 5.6275 0.0000 21.6987 
Non-English speaking background 0.1006 0.1021 0.0128 0.4378 
II. ACTUAL AND NOTIONAL EXPENDITURES 
Library services      
Actual unit expenditures $17.39 $28.82 $2.38 $366.24 
Standardised unit expenditures $18.04 $33.26 $2.39 $425.83 
Waste management services     
Actual unit expenditures $68.37 $36.79 $46.37 $137.92 
Standardised unit expenditures $155.79 $174.24 $98.16 $1812.15 
Planning and regulatory services     
Actual unit expenditures $9.57 $35.78 $8.69 $406.47 
Standardised unit expenditures $15.88 $42.83 $5.33 $489.09 
III. DISCRETIONARY INPUTS AND OUTPUTS    
Library services     
Gross library expenditure $681.76 $997.37 $20.00 $5050.96 
Library issues 256.97 354.26 2.30 2069.87 
Waste management services     
Collection expenditure  $1211.17 $1458.76 $10.98 $7429.65 
Total garbage collected 17529 18592 110 74270 
Total recyclables collected 2123 2561 1 12157 
Implied recycling rate 0.1507 0.1514 0.0000 0.8100 
Planning and regulatory services     
Planning and regulatory expenditure $825.75 $1045.62 $333.25 $4533.40 
Legal expenditure  67.45 109.14 0.00 567.00 
Full-time equivalent staff 10.43 14.61 0.25 107.00 
Number of BAs determined 903.39 1008.63 19.00 4683.00 
Number of DAs determined 344.66 346.69 0.00 1760.00 
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Finally, the disability factor for planning and regulatory services is a function of: (i) 
population growth rate (GRO) (indicating extra requirements for forward planning); (ii) a 
development index (DEV) (reflecting the need for additional development control); (iii) 
an index of heritage/environmental sensitivity (HER) (recognising additional 
complexities in plan preparation for sensitive areas); (iv) the proportion of non-residential 
building activity (NRES) (additional complexities in processing commercial and 
industrial plans); and (v) the proportion of the population from a NESB (NESB) 
(additional costs of information provision in languages other than English). 
Actual and notional unit expenditures 
The second group of variables in Table 2 indicates the expenditures for each function, 
both actual unit expenditures (UNIT) and standardised unit expenditures (STD), as 
calculated by the NSWLGGC. The unit basis is per capita in the case of library and 
planning services, and per urban property for waste management services. The general 
formula for the calculation of expenditure allowances is also based on the standard cost 
for the services (generally the state weighted average unit cost based upon actual 
expenditure) and the disability factor derived using the functional disabilities (expressed 
as a percentage above standard cost). In turn, each council’s standardised unit 
expenditure is used as the basis for the distribution of financial assistance for each 
function. Although it is expected that a close correlation exists between standardised unit 
expenditures (notional grant) and actual unit expenditures (as the Commission and 
councils respond to many of the same environmental factors), the assumption of ‘effort 
neutrality’ is meant to ensure that a council’s grant is assessed independently of council 
policy decisions. Similarly, effort neutrality has also been interpreted to mean that 
councils should not be able to act in a manner which affects their grant (AURDR, 1994a: 
13). Using this institutional criteria, expenditures, both actual and notional, should be 
independent of each other. 
One further point to note about the standardised unit expenditure is that whereas it is a 
direct reflection of the relative distribution of financial assistance grants for each 
function, it does not necessarily correspond to any absolute value of dollar funding. Three 
qualifying conditions have been suggested. First, the Commission’s calculation of 
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equalisation grants is made without reference to the funds available from the 
Commonwealth. Second, the relevant legislation requires that every local council 
receives at least a minimum amount; that is, an amount that would be allocated if 30 
percent of available funds were distributed on a per capita basis. Accordingly, “the 
notional equalisation grants to each council must be re-scaled: firstly, to the available 
funds; and secondly, to bring those councils below the per capita minimum entitlement 
up to that level” (NSWLGGC, 1994). Finally, because the methodology excludes, as far 
as practicable, councils’ policies and practices (effort neutrality), the grants, while 
calculated on the basis of several functions, are essentially untied. Thus, although 
councils are aware of both their own and the state’s standardised unit cost for each 
function, there is no compulsion on the council’s behalf to use grant funding for 
particular purposes. 
Discretionary inputs and outputs 
The final group of variables in Table 2 relate to the discretionary inputs and outputs 
employed by councils to provide each of the three selected services. For library services, 
the single input employed is total library expenditure (EXP), whilst the range of library 
outputs are proxied by the number of issues (ISS). In the case of waste management 
services, three outputs are specified; namely, the total tonnage of garbage collected 
(GAR), total tonnage of recyclable material collected (REC), and the rate of recycling as a 
proportion of total garbage collection (RATE). The single input for waste management 
services is total collection costs (COL). The final function, for planning and regulatory 
services, combines the inputs of planning expenditure, both legal (LGL) and non-legal 
(P&R), and planning-related staff (STA) to produce outputs in the form of processed 
building (BA) and development (DA) applications. Whereas these inputs and outputs do 
suffer from a number of limitations, they are the only such data known to exist at a 
suitably disaggregated level. 
One particular issue that arises in DEA is that the measured efficiencies are based on a 
comparison with the observed best-practice frontier and therefore can be susceptible to 
outliers. The London Economics (1999: 50) submission to the IPART inquiry into NSW 
electricity distribution suggests that potential outliers can be identified “…via a screening 
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process prior to modelling” and if identified “…removed from the sample if there is some 
doubt as to the validity of the data that defines its performance”. Further, “as a 
sensitivity, it is useful to remove potentially outlying distributions from the sample to 
determine if the absolute levels of efficiency alter substantially, indicating that a potential 
outlier, or potential outliers, have a large influence upon the efficient frontier” (London 
Economics 1999: 50). In that particular analysis, “…potential outliers were identified as 
being those observations that lie more than 3 standard deviations from the sample mean” 
(London Economics 1999: 31).  
A more technical alternative used in this study is to test the output-input ratios for 
each function for normality (symmetry and mesokurtosis) using the Jarque-Bera Wald 
statistic. The test statistics for library services expenditure (1.0136), waste management 
services expenditure (0.5344) and planning and regulatory services (0.5933) fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of normality [W = 5.9915 ∼ χ2(2)] and we may conclude that the 
output-input ratios are asymptotically normally distributed. This analysis suggests that 
potential outliers in the output-input data do not present too severe a problem, and that 
the efficient frontier is likely to be robust with respect to the specification of the sample 
set. 
Specification of associational models 
The final methodological requirement is to specify the technique for explaining 
variation in efficiency and grants on the basis of the vector of objective disability factors. 
A regression-based approach is used for this purpose. As we have seen, since the measure 
of efficiency calculated and standardised unit expenditures (grants) are both limited 
dependent variables, tobit estimation is appropriate. Grant relativities are therefore 
examined as a function of imposed disabilities for each council, and corresponding to the 
hypothesis that the grants process violates effort neutrality, a measure of efficiency. 
However, it is also hypothesised that grant relativities may exert an influence on the 
efficiency of local councils (calculated on the basis of discretionary factors only). 
Accordingly, the tobit model may be embedded in a recursive simultaneous equations 
model as follows: 
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where y1 is the measure of relative grant funding for each council, y2 is a measure of 
technical efficiency for each council, x1 and x2 are vectors of explanatory variables 
posited to influence y1 and y2 respectively, ε1 and  ε2 are errors terms, and β and π are 
parameters to be estimated. This approach follows the procedures detailed in Greene 
(1995), and incorporates tests for exogeneity based on Blundell and Smith (1986). 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the results of the nonparametric approach to 
efficiency measurement outlined above. Since the focus in the current section is on the 
relationships in local government between discretionary inputs/outputs, relative grants 
and  disability factors, these efficiency indices have been computed solely on the basis of 
inputs and outputs over which managerial control is exercised. That is, no account is 
taken of the imposed environment in which local governments operate. 
Technical and scale efficiency and returns-to-scale 
The first set of summary statistics in Table 3 concern the efficiency indices and the 
nature of returns-to-scale in library services for 166 New South Wales local governments. 
On the basis of discretionary inputs and outputs only, less than one percent of councils 
are overall technically efficient, slightly more than two percent are pure technically 
efficient, and less than two percent are scale efficient.  
Given that one particular focus of attention is the role of intergovernmental grants in 
supporting scale inefficient councils, the role of scale effects is examined in detail. As 
shown in Table 3, local government libraries in New South Wales were, on average, 74 
percent scale efficient. However, if councils could adjust their library services to their 
optimal scale, inputs could be proportionately reduced, on average, by 26 percent. The 
results also indicate that the majority of councils are equally divided between 
inefficiencies derived from a smaller than optimal scale of operations (increasing returns-
to-scale), and a larger than optimal scale (decreasing returns-to-scale).  Descriptive 
statistics for these sub-groups of councils on the basis of library expenditures (in 
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thousands) are also provided. On average, councils with an appropriate scale of 
operations for local government library services have an expenditure of $386,000 and a 
population of 18,882. on the other hand, councils with a smaller than optimal scale have a 
mean library expenditure of $94,000 and an average population of 6,657, whereas those 
with decreasing returns-to-scale have a mean expenditure of $1,420,000 and a population 
average of 70,630. 
Table 3. Efficiency Indices and Returns-to-Scale 
Description  Number Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Library services       
Technical All councils 166 0.1751 0.1330 0.0270 1.0000 
 Inefficient councils 165 0.1701 0.1168 0.0270 0.9860 
Pure technical All councils 166 0.2794 0.2001 0.0560 1.0000 
 Inefficient councils 162 0.2616 0.1668 0.0560 0.9350 
Scale All councils 166 0.7438 0.2979 0.0440 1.0000 
 Inefficient councils 164 0.7407 0.2984 0.0440 0.9990 
Returns-to-scale Increasing 87 $94.36 $78.64 $20.00 $407.00 
 Constant 7 $386.52 $237.19 $44.46 $703.00 
 Decreasing 72 $1420.25 $1146.76 $186.70 $5050.96 
Waste management services 
Technical All councils 103 0.2199 0.1813 0.0390 1.0000 
 Inefficient councils 100 0.1965 0.1219 0.0390 0.5300 
Pure technical All councils 103 0.4360 0.2799 0.0500 1.0000 
 Inefficient councils 90 0.3545 0.1913 0.0500 0.9510 
Scale All councils 103 0.5298 0.2005 0.0760 1.0000 
 Inefficient councils 100 0.5157 0.1857 0.0760 0.9950 
Returns-to-scale Increasing 19 $63.07 $69.80 $19.75 $320.00 
 Constant 3 $26.85 $19.07 $10.98 $48.00 
 Decreasing 81 $1524.33 $1499.04 $68.00 $7429.65 
Planning and regulatory services 
Technical All councils 128 0.4229 0.2307 0.0490 1.0000 
 Inefficient councils 123 0.3994 0.2029 0.0490 0.9580 
Pure technical All councils 128 0.6317 0.2706 0.1050 1.0000 
 Inefficient councils 98 0.5190 0.2027 0.1050 0.9620 
Scale All councils 128 0.6780 0.2015 0.2460 1.0000 
 Inefficient councils 123 0.6649 0.1945 0.2460 0.9890 
Returns-to-scale Increasing 9 $34.52 $40.98 $30.00 $112.19 
 Constant 5 $839.80 $1807.07 $250.12 $4072.00 
 Decreasing 114 $887.60 $1029.24 $756.00 $4533.40 
Table 3 presents a similar descriptive analysis for domestic waste management 
services in 103 New South Wales local governments. Here councils were conceptualised 
as minimising the input of gross collection expenditure for some given level of garbage 
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and recyclable material collected and the ratio of recyclable material to non-recyclable 
material. Once again, based on the vector of discretionary inputs and outputs only, very 
few council’s waste management services are either technically or scale efficient. Only 
three councils are overall technically efficient (assuming constant returns-to-scale), 
thirteen councils are purely technically efficient (assuming variable returns-to-scale), and 
three councils are scale efficient.  
However, the source of scale inefficiencies appears to be largely derived from councils 
with a larger than optimal scale of operations, with 81 councils (or 79 percent) 
experiencing decreasing returns-to-scale. Councils subject to decreasing returns-to-scale 
in waste management services had, on average, 17,338 serviced properties, whereas those 
with increasing returns-to-scale averaged 698 properties, and constant returns-to-scale 
councils averaged 984 properties. Based on state average occupancy rates these would 
equate to council populations of 46,273, 1,863 and 2,626 persons respectively. However, 
despite the finding of a large number of scale inefficient councils, and similar to the 
analysis of library services, the results indicate that pure technical inefficiency, rather 
than scale inefficiency, was the main source of technical inefficiency in waste 
management services.  
A descriptive analysis for planning and regulatory services in 128 New South Wales 
local governments is also presented in Table 3. The indices calculated indicate the 
maximal equiproportionate reduction of inputs: namely, planning expenditure (both legal 
and non-legal) and full-time equivalent staff, consistent with a given level of outputs in 
the form of building and development approvals. Once again, the main source of scale 
inefficiency in planning and regulator services flows from maintaining operations at a 
larger than optimal scale: the average level of planning expenditure suggests that scale 
inefficiencies increase after a mean expenditure level of $839,000. On average, councils 
subject to decreasing returns-to-scale had a population of 45,040, those with constant 
returns-to-scale a population of 35,040, and those with increasing returns-to-scale a 
population of 3,134. However, in contrast to both library and waste management services, 
the sources of overall technical efficiency appear to be equally composed of purely 
technical inefficiency and scale inefficiency.  
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One final analysis is made to examine the relationships between these three sets of 
separately computed efficiency measures across local governments. Because the 
normality assumptions of the Pearson (product moment) correlation coefficient are 
unlikely to hold, Spearman (rank) correlation coefficients are employed. The only 
significant correlations (positive) are between library service efficiency and waste 
management service efficiency. This would appear sensible in that human and 
community services are more closely aligned than economic services,  
However, since the efficiency improvements calculated are based solely on 
discretionary factors, these descriptive analyses must be interpreted with caution. In 
particular, and in common with the preceding discussion, a large number of contextual or 
environmental factors are thought to influence the production correspondence relating 
inputs to outputs in local public services. These are likely to bias the productivity 
improvements possible through greater managerial efficiency. Similarly, there are, at 
least in the case of scale diseconomies, a large number of social, demographic and 
geographic barriers in local public services which may prevent efforts to improve 
efficiency through amalgamations or separation of functions.  
One obvious limitation is that the optimal scale of operations for any one function, say 
library services, may not correspond to the optimal scale for other functions, such as 
waste management services (Jones, 1993). Another is that the productivity gains made 
possible by attaining an optimal scale of operations are generally found to be less 
significant than those that could result from an improvement in managerial efficiency. 
Yet another is that the entire issue of economies of scope in local public sector services is 
ignored.  
Efficiency and intergovernmental grants 
Notwithstanding these results, the main focus here falls on the hypothesised 
relationships between local government efficiency and relative grants. The estimated 
coefficients and standard errors of the simultaneous equations tobit models for library, 
waste management and planning services are detailed in Table 4. The first three columns 
of results relate to a two equation regression model for library services: the first equation 
is where grant relativities are regressed on actual unit expenditures, disability factors and 
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technical efficiency (assuming variable returns-to-scale); and the second equation is 
where efficiency is regressed on nondiscretionary disability factors. The estimator is full 
information maximum likelihood. A likelihood ratio test with the restriction that all the 
parameters are equal to zero with chi-square distribution [LR = 15.0100 ∼ χ2(7)] is 
rejected at the .05 level.  
In terms of the individual coefficients in the first equation, only UNIT (actual unit 
expenditure) is significant and conforms to the hypothesised sign. As expected, there is a 
strong correlation between actual unit expenditures in library services and the 
standardised unit expenditures calculated by the NSWLGGC. Pearson’s (product-
moment) and Spearman’s (rank) correlation are found to be positively significant at the 
.01 level, the results of an ANOVA table [(SSB/K-1)/(SSW/N-K) = 0.034 ∼ F(1, 330)] fail 
to reject the null hypothesis of equal means, and Bartlett’s homogeneity of variance test 
(B = 3.3611 ∼ χ2(1) fails to reject the null hypotheses of equal variances at the .05 level.  
The coefficient on the efficiency score is also insignificant, thereby offering no 
support for the proposition that the NSWLGGC funding methodology, either explicitly or 
implicitly, rewards or penalises local government library service efficiency (put 
differently, that grants are not determined by efficiency). The exogeneity of efficiency is 
tested using a t-test of the hypothesis that ρ[ε1,ε2] = 0. The null hypothesis is rejected at 
the .01 level and we may conclude that local government efficiency is influenced by the 
present local government funding methodology (that is, that efficiency is determined by 
grants). The second equation also supports the argument that library service efficiency, as 
calculated on the basis of discretionary factors alone, is adversely influenced by imposed 
factors reflecting the population distribution (DIST), the proportion of non-residential 
borrowers (NRES), and the proportion of the population that are aged (AGE), students 
(STUD), or from a non-English speaking background (NESB). These results reinforce the 
need to incorporate contextual factors into microeconomic efficiency analyses. 
Table 4. Estimates of Simultaneous Equations Tobit Models 
Library services Waste management services Planning and regulatory services 
Variable Coefficient Std. error Variable Coefficient Std. error Variable Coefficient Std. error 
 Equation for grant relativities Equation for grant relativities Equation for grant relativities 
Constant -0.3581 1.6899 Constant 0.7996 104.1500 Constant -0.1600 0.7854
UNIT ***0.2428 0.0027 UNIT -0.0064 0.2919 UNIT ***0.4164 0.0418
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DIST 0.0012 0.1885 OCC -41.7966 6441.0000 GRO 34.6684 23.1800
NESB 3.6160 53.2530 DENS 1.0748 236.4100 DEV 0.0035 0.0543
NRES 1.8785 24.0310 DIST -1.0730 179.3200 HER *0.5374 0.3332
AGE 3.8227 58.3320 DISP -1.8571 439.2400 NRES 7.2945 30.5920
STUD 13.1101 135.2000 EFF -3.1302 299.2200 DIST 0.0581 0.0491
EFF 5.1770 58.8670    NESB 3.6426 4.1351
      EFF 1.7613 2.3758
Equation  for efficiency Equation  for efficiency Equation  for efficiency 
DIST ***-0.0012 0.0003 OCC ***-
38.4520
4.6387 GRO 2.7248 3.4551
NESB ***-4.6865 0.3729 DENS ***-0.9155 0.3466 DEV 0.0011 0.0121
NRES ***-1.9029 0.3296 DIST ***-1.2597 0.3070 HER ***-0.1394 0.0375
AGE ***-4.6169 0.4620 DISP **-1.3603 0.5828 NRES **-5.6633 2.8721
STUD ***-
12.1560 
0.3948    DIST ***-0.0026 0.0006
      NESB ***-3.4642 0.4498
Disturbances/correlation Disturbance/correlation Disturbance/correlation 
σ1 ***0.2094 10.8940 σ1 0.0042 75.8040 σ1 0.3809 0.4148
σ2 5.1236 0.0104 σ2 ***3.2272 0.0312 σ2 ***2.9487 0.0386
ρ[ε1,ε2] ***0.9522 0.2230 ρ[ε1,ε2] ***-0.8767 0.0902 ρ[ε1,ε2] ***0.6359 0.1639
Log-likelihood Log-likelihood Log-likelihood 
 -270.8715  -670.6213 -336.3636  
Accordingly, a single equation tobit model is used to examine grant relativities and 
disabilities as determinants of library service technical efficiency. This is technically 
necessary because the focus in the simultaneous equations tobit model is on the tobit 
model (equation for grant relativities), not the regression model (equation for efficiency). 
Further, an additional focus in the single equation regression is the relative importance of 
grant relativities (as represented by standardised unit expenditures) as compared to 
physical disabilities as a determinant of efficiency.  
Estimated coefficients, standard errors and elasticities (calculated at the means) are 
presented in Table 5. Over the 166 local government library services, the level of grants 
(STD), population distribution (DIST), and the proportion of non-residential (NRES) and 
student (STUD) borrowers are found to be a negative, though insignificant influence on 
relative efficiency. The proportion of borrowers who are aged (AGE) is also insignificant 
and does not conform to the a priori sign, and only the coefficient on the proportion of 
users from a non-English speaking background is significant and conforms to the 
hypothesised sign. However, a Wald test statistic [W = 25.4057 ∼ χ2(5)] with chi-square 
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distribution rejects the null hypothesis of the joint insignificance of the disability factors 
at the .01 level. 
Table 5 also presents the results of separate tobit regressions where local governments 
are divided into two groups. The first group consists of those councils with standardised 
unit costs (relative grant) lower than the state standard, while the second consists of those 
with a relative grant higher than the state standard. All other things being equal, it is 
hypothesised that the statutory requirements of awarding a minimum grant, and the 
practice of the NSWLGGC of not allowing for negative disability factors, implies that 
councils with a low standardised unit cost will receive a grant in excess of disability 
requirements. It is suggested that most of the councils in this category will receive a grant 
either at or slightly above the statutory minimum, and that this overcompensation may 
have an adverse affect on incentives to minimise input usage.  
The main difference in this regression is that the coefficient on financial assistance 
grants is significantly different from zero at the .01 level. The calculated elasticities also 
suggest that, at the margin, the grant system may exert a greater negative influence on 
technical efficiency (-0.558) than the disabilities posed by a council having a high 
proportion of NESB users (-0.129), or having a sparsely distributed population (-0.086). 
As anticipated, the influence of the grant systems is not significant for those councils 
with a higher than state standard unit cost, where the grant system may only partially, if 
at all, cover the imposed disabilities in councils’ operating environments. Despite the low 
individual levels of significance for the disability coefficients, Wald chi-square tests 
likewise reject the null hypotheses of joint insignificance; at the .05 level for lower than 
standard unit cost councils [W = 14.2913 ∼ χ2(5)], and at the .01 level for councils above 
the state standard [W = 16.7177 ∼ χ2(5)]. 
The second three columns in Table 4 present the coefficients and standard errors 
where waste management disability factors and waste management technical efficiency 
are included as explanatory variables for waste management grant relativities, and where 
efficiency is assumed to be endogenously determined by grants and an identical vector of 
waste management disabilities. A log-likelihood ratio test of the restriction that all the 
slope coefficients are jointly zero [LR = 2.1226 ∼ χ2(5)] is not significant at any 
conventional level. Unlike the earlier results, no individual coefficients in the grant 
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relativities equation are significant. Technical efficiency in waste management service is 
also insignificant. Moreover, there is no significant relationship between the actual unit 
costs of waste management services in local government, and the notional costs 
calculated by the grants commission. Scrutiny of the correlation coefficients reveals that 
though unit costs are positively rank correlated (0.6351), there is a negative product-
moment correlation (-0.3608). Standard tests for the homogeneity of mean and variance 
for these variables are also rejected [(SSB/K-1)/(SSW/N-K) = 24.049 ∼ F(1, 206), B = 
185.48 ∼ χ2(1)]. Analysis of the means of these two measures confirms that the 
standardised unit costs calculated for the purpose of grants ($154.29) is almost twice as 
high as actual unit costs ($68.37). Whilst it is not possible to speculate on the actual 
distribution of grants for this purpose, it can be argued that the grants methodology may 
overly compensate councils for imposed disabilities in what is ostensibly a highly 
competitive local government service.  
Furthermore, despite the Commission’s stated methodology for calculating disability 
factors in waste management services, the vector of explanatory variables appears to be 
virtually unrelated to actual calculated outcomes. One possible source of this lack of 
association may be that negative disability factors are not calculated for a large number 
of councils and that this serves to reduce the explanatory power of the model as a whole. 
Another source could well be the lack of correlation between actual and notional costs in 
waste management services as discussed above. 
The estimated coefficients, standard errors and elasticities (at the means) for the 
second single-stage tobit regression are presented in Table 5. Over the entire sample, 
neither grants nor the disability factors are individually significant. It is only in the case 
of councils with lower than state standard unit costs that the disability factors influence 
the level of technical efficiency. The estimated coefficients on population density (DENS) 
and distribution (DIST) are both negative and significant, with the marginal effect on 
efficiency being higher for population density (-0.365) than population distribution (-
0.106). These elasticities conform with the relative weightings of these factors in the 
NSWLGGC calculations. However, in councils with a higher than state standard unit cost 
there is no significant influence on efficiency in waste management services from the 
hypothesised disability factors, either individually or jointly [W = 1.9313 ∼ χ2(6)]). 
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Although the LGGC bears no regard to the impact of disability factors on technical 
efficiency in councils, it could be inferred that the hypothesised disability factors may be 
overemphasised in grant relativities based on standard unit costs.  
The final three columns in Table 4 relate to the simultaneous equations tobit 
regression results for planning and regulatory services in 104 New South Wales local 
governments. In the first equation, standardised unit costs (grants) for the planning and 
regulatory function are regressed upon the notional unit costs (UNIT), population growth 
rate (GRO), an index of development activity (DEV), a measures of 
heritage/environmental sensitivity (HER), the proportion of non-residential building 
activity (NRES), population distribution (DIST), and the proportion of the population 
from a non-English speaking background (NESB). Of these variables, only the 
coefficients on unit costs and heritage/environmental sensitivity are significant and 
conform to the ex ante sign.  
A log-likelihood ratio test with chi-square distribution [LR = 13.808 ∼ χ2(8)] rejects 
the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of the slope coefficients at the .10 level. Once 
again, the coefficient on technical efficiency is negative, though insignificant. The value 
of rho (ρ ∼ tλ/2) is significant at the .01 level, thereby rejecting the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity and suggesting that technical efficiency is endogenously determined by the 
level of grants. However, unlike the previous two functions, not all the coefficients in the 
second equation are significant. In particular, the measures of population growth (GRO) 
and development activity (DEV) are an insignificant influence on the level of efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Grants and Disabilities as Efficiency Determinants 
Library services 
 All councils (n = 166) 
 
Councils with lower than state 
standard unit cost (n = 118) 
Councils with higher than state 
standard unit cost (n = 48) 
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 Coefficient Std. error Elasticity Coefficient Std. error Elasticity Coefficient Std. error Elasticity
Constant *1.6869 0.9525 **2.8426 1.3491 0.7883 1.5331
STD -0.0001 0.0027 -0.0014 ***-0.0916 0.0303 -0.5581 0.0001 0.0030 0.0032
DIST -0.0024 0.0137 -0.0073 *-0.0300 0.0154 -0.0862 ***-0.1091 0.0344 0.2917
NESB ***-4.0749 1.0484 -0.2311 **-4.0734 1.8590 -0.1299 -2.0961 1.4718 -0.2669
NRES -0.8114 1.1118 -0.0323 -0.8123 1.8442 -0.0168 0.0601 1.4602 0.0057
AGE 2.0630 2.4316 0.2301 3.1601 3.0233 0.2985 0.7267 4.8076 0.1006
STUD -0.6325 3.4092 -0.0802 -1.0807 4.7722 -0.1182 1.4876 5.2002 0.2238
 Log-likelihood 34.7103; Wald chi-
square statistic for disability factors  
25.4057.  
Log-likelihood 33.7926; Wald chi-
square statistic for disability factors 
14.2913.  
Log-likelihood 12.4904; Wald chi-
square statistic for disability factors 
16.7177.  
Waste management services 
 All councils (n = 104) 
 
Councils with lower than state 
standard unit cost (n = 66) 
Councils with higher than state 
standard unit cost (n = 38) 
 Coefficient Std. error Elasticity Coefficient Std. error Elasticity Coefficient Std. error Elasticity
Constant ***1.5440 0.5582 0.7069 0.7124 **3.3530 1.5475
STD 0.0002 0.0008 0.0212 0.0024 0.0040 0.1610 -0.0005 0.0011 -0.0838
OCC 2.7138 18.6420 0.0482 15.5790 25.2060 0.2509 -43.7370 45.8450 -0.8424
DENS -1.0102 0.6604 -0.1812 **-2.5483 1.0897 -0.3657 -0.6461 0.9849 -0.1476
DIST -0.6090 0.5628 -0.0391 *-1.2802 0.7037 -0.1063 0.1655 1.0203 0.0043
DISP 0.4773 1.5840 0.0864 3.4896 2.5269 0.5749 -0.8448 2.1616 -0.1648
 Log-likelihood -39.4109; Wald chi-
square statistic for disability factors 
3.4368.  
Log-likelihood -24.5954; Wald chi-
square statistic for disability factors 
6.9682.  
Log-likelihood -11.6530; Wald chi-
square statistic for disability factors 
1.9313.  
Planning and regulatory services 
 All councils (n = 128) 
 
Councils with lower than state 
standard unit cost (n = 98) 
Councils with higher than state 
standard unit cost (n = 30) 
 Coefficient Std. error Elasticity Coefficient Std. error Elasticity Coefficient Std. error Elasticity
Constant ***2.0365 0.3267 ***1.7373 0.4503 ***2.5765 0.9823
STD *-0.0229 0.0136 -0.1484 -0.0013 0.0331 -0.0043 0.0237 0.0387 0.4341
GRO 13.0630 8.0610 0.0677 14.2930 11.9750 0.0540 10.1600 19.9250 0.1029
DEV 0.0193 0.0182 0.1028 0.0276 0.0368 0.0964 -0.0368 0.0499 -0.4410
HER 0.1192 0.1150 0.1005 0.1906 0.1389 0.1429 -0.3620 0.2767 -0.3980
NRES 7.5717 8.3506 0.0717 9.2918 10.2550 0.0744 9.0275 18.3360 0.1264
DIST -0.0139 0.0175 -0.0254 -0.0131 0.0216 -0.0203 0.0153 0.0338 0.0406
NESB ***-2.8534 1.0193 -0.1174 ***-3.3085 1.0918 -0.1254 -3.1131 4.9091 -0.1503
 Log-likelihood –54.9952; Wald chi-
square statistic for disability factors 
16.7189.  
Log-likelihood –39.6514; Wald chi-
square statistic for disability factors 
17.7403.  
Log-likelihood –12.1213; Wald chi-
square statistic for disability factors 
4.4361.  
With this in mind, the second single equation tobit model is constructed with technical 
efficiency regressed upon grants and imposed disability factors. The estimated 
coefficients, standard errors and elasticities (at the means) are contained in Table 5. A 
Wald test statistic [W = 16.7189 ∼ χ2(6)] rejects the null hypothesis of the joint 
insignificance of the disability factors at the .05 level, although only the proportion of 
residents from a NESB is individually significant. The sign on grants is significant and 
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negative suggesting that the grants methodology employed promotes inefficiency in 
planning and regulatory services. This effect would appear to hold whether councils are 
above or below the state standard unit cost. However, only in the case of councils 
receiving close to the minimum grant is the proportion of the population from a NESB a 
significant negative influence on efficiency: Wald tests of the joint insignificance of the 
disability factors on measured efficiency are rejected at the .01 level for councils with a 
lower than state standard unit cost (grant) [W = 17.7034 ∼ χ2(6)] and fails to be rejected 
for councils with a higher than state standard unit cost [W = 4.4361 ∼ χ2(6)]. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The results emerging from the current analysis are threefold.  First, the hypothesis that 
the NSWLGGC’s grant methodology, either explicitly or implicitly, rewards efficient or 
inefficient councils has not been supported. While relative grants to councils do vary 
according to certain factors relevant to microeconomic efficiency measurement, these 
same factors are generally categorised as ‘nondiscretionary’ or ‘contextual’ and thereby 
reflect conditions that are imposed upon local governments’ operating environments. 
Therefore specific allowances to accommodate these factors are entirely consistent with 
the NSWLGGC’s stated objective of horizontal fiscal equalisation, and the absence of 
any systematic influence of council policy-related decisions on grants vis-à-vis 
efficiency, maintains the assumption of effort neutrality.  
Second, and irrespective of the finding of effort neutrality, grants appear to exert a 
negative influence upon efficiency. However, contrary to the grant illusion literature 
where inefficiency is thought to arise in councils relatively dependent on grant income, 
inefficiency in the NSWLGGC grants system appears to arise from restrictions on the 
process of horizontal fiscal equalisation; namely, minimum grant requirements and the 
failure to calculate non-positive disabilities. Put simply, councils with a high standardised 
unit cost (grant) flowing from a broad range of disability factors appear to be given 
appropriate fiscal allowances under the present grants system, whereas councils with a 
low standardised unit cost (grant) derived from a small number of disabilities tend to be 
either under or over-funded. For example, the statutory requirement of a minimum per 
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capita grant implies that some councils are receiving expenditure allowances in excess of 
notional requirements, thus promoting inefficient behaviour.  
Equivalently, the failure of the grants system to calculate negative disabilities for 
councils with disability levels lower than the state standard (ie. proportion of aged, 
children, NESBs, etc.) implies that the goal of full horizontal equalisation is not being 
realised. Moreover, inefficiency may also arise from a council only having a small 
number of individual disabilities, implying a relatively low grant. For instance, the 
weighting system used for individual disabilities, and the process of averaging used to 
calculate an overall disability factor, limits the positive effect of individual disabilities on 
grant income. However, the influence of grants upon measured efficiency varies 
significantly across councils and council functions, suggesting that other factors are at 
play. 
These findings are particularly important because it provides evidence concerning the 
interplay between the productive performance of local governments and the revenue-
raising system under which they operate. While this paper has only addressed the issue of 
intergovernmental grants, it is possible that other revenue-raising devices may also exert 
an influence on local government efficiency. For example, while rate revenue is subject 
to rate-pegging and other controls, fewer restrictions are placed on local governments’ 
use of user charges and fees and contributions. Ease of access and the growing 
importance of these alternative sources of revenue means that local governments may be 
able to prop up inefficient operations from sources other than grants. Alternatively, the 
use of user pays systems such as these may actively promote efficient outcomes in local 
government services. Whether the level and composition of own-source non-rate revenue 
has a systematic influence on productive efficiency is an empirical question that needs to 
be addressed. 
Finally, one factor that the grants methodology may need to take account of lies the 
nature of scale economies in local public services. Notwithstanding the social, 
geographic, political and institutional barriers that may prevent structural reform, there is 
still the requirement that the grants system take account of these factors and ensure that 
the objective of horizontal fiscal equalisation is fully realised. A significant issue is that 
some local government functions are subject to increasing returns-to-scale, and therefore 
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experience a falling average cost. Another interesting question resides in the fact that 
some councils may be ‘forced’ to operate at a larger than optimal scale in order to 
provide a prescribed level of service. Issues of scale should therefore be incorporated into 
the NSWLGGC’s grant methodology, in order to appropriately compensate for these 
effects. However, there is also the suspicion that the current grants system’s failure to 
allocate grants in a manner consistent with full horizontal fiscal equalisation may require 
some councils to operate at a smaller than optimal scale of operations, or may assist 
others in sustaining a larger than optimal scale. These questions are equally deserving of 
attention. 
At least three caveats should be added to these general conclusions. First, given the 
diminishing magnitude of grants as a proportion of total revenue in NSW local 
government, and the concomitant growing significance of other factors, especially ‘rate-
pegging’, the scope for the grants mechanism to enhance the efficiency of service 
delivery in NSW local government may be limited. Secondly, our results were derived 
from performance indicator data collected and published prior to the IPART (1998) Final 
Report. If the recommendations advanced by IPART are followed in the compilation of 
future performance indicators which more accurately reflect the behaviour of councils, 
then this materially affect the outcomes of empirical investigations exemplified by this 
study. Finally, the results obtained differ in some respects from those of an earlier, but 
similar, study of NSW local government libraries by Worthington (1999). In that study 
[also used in IPART’s (1998) final report] the nondiscretionary factors used in the 
analysis of library services were incorporated directly into the DEA program itself, rather 
than by using a second-stage regression. While the two approaches are theoretically 
consistent, the emphasis in the present paper on quantifying the relative impact of 
physical disabilities on efficiency necessitated the latter approach, and thereby accounts 
for some variation in results.  
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